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IN THE UTAH SUPREMECOURT 
BRIGHAM CITY, ) 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) 
CHARLES W. STUART, SHAYNE ) 
R. STUART and SANDRA A. 
TAYLOR ) 
Defendants-Respondents ) 
Case No. 20021004-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from its decision in Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App 317, 57 P.3d 1111 (Addendum 
B). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(5) 
(2002). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue: Are the trial court's Findings of Fact and its conclusion that no exigent 
circumstance existed mutually exclusive? 
Standard of Review: When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the trial court. State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, P12; State v. Topanotes 2003 UT 30, P8; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, P25, 63 P.3d 650; State v. James, 2000 UT P8,13 P.3d 576. The decision of the 
court of appeals is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Constitution amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
On July 23, 2000, defendants were arrested at a home in Brigham City on various 
misdemeanor charges and they filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a 
result of the warrantless entry by Brigham City police into the residence. Their argument 
was that there was no exigent circumstance sufficient to justify a warrantless entry into 
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the dwelling. The trial court agreed, making five specific findings of fact, concluding that 
the circumstances did not fall within the "exigent circumstances" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement, and granted the motion. (Addendum A.) The court of 
appeals first declined Brigham City's request to make additional findings of fact. Stuart, 
2002 Ut App 317, P 6, 10, 11. The court then concluded that based upon those specific 
findings of fact, the conclusion of the trial court was correct. Id at P 13,15. This Court 
granted Brigham City's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On July 23, 2000, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Brigham City police 
received a call complaining about a loud party at 1074 Orchard St. in Brigham city, and 
officers were dispatched. Upon their arrival, the officers determined that no one was in 
the front part of the house and the noises and loud voices were emanating from the rear. 
They declined to knock on the front door, citing concerns for their safety, and went 
around the house down the driveway to the backyard where there was a six-foot privacy 
fence around the yard. The officers testified that they saw two minors in the backyard 
consuming alcohol. They then entered the back yard through the closed gate. 
Subsequently they observed through the kitchen window four adults (two male and two 
female) restraining and trying to calm another youth. The officer testified he saw the 
youth free a hand and strike one of the adults. There was a great deal of yelling and 
struggling and the officer testified that the person whom he saw get hit was at the sink, 
rinsing the blood out of his mouth with water whereupon on officer opened the door, 
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stepped in, and announced his presence. When no one paid attention to him, he stepped 
in front of the adults and more forcefully announced his presence. He then testified that it 
still took a lengthy period of time for anyone to acknowledge him. The officers arrested 
the three juveniles, releasing one to his parents, and five adults (one had been in bed 
asleep at the time). The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that 
there was no exigent circumstance to justify the warrantless entry into the home. The 
prosecution argued that there were two potential exigent circumstances: a medical 
emergency and the presence of an immediate serious threat to someone. The court found 
that neither of those circumstances existed and Brigham City objected to the Findings of 
Fact proposed by the defense, offering their own version, which was adopted by the court. 
These were the findings to which both parties stipulated on appeal, and the Court of 
Appeals concluded that given the Findings of Fact, the trial court did not err in 
determining that the circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry into the private 
residence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The court of appeals made a very narrow ruling that is not at all subject to broad 
application. The ruling was based solely upon the findings of the trial court which were 
unchallenged by Petitioner. Indeed, they were drafted by Petitioner and in no way do they 
mandate a conclusion there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless 
entry into the home. The court of appeals properly reviewed the trial court's application 
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of well-established Fourth Amendment principles to the undisputed facts in the case. The 
court's dicta in paragraph thirteen can in no way be construed as establishing a new 
standard for determining exigent circumstances in Fourth Amendment analysis nor was it 
the basis for the court's decision. That dicta is simply not an issue in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACCURATELY REVIEWED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The court of appeals first declined to make additional findings of fact that would 
be necessary to support a conclusion of exigent circumstances in this case. Brigham City 
had made the request during oral arguments. Id. at P 10,11. In paragraph 7 of the 
opinion, the court points out that the prosecution bears a "particularly heavy" burden 
when trying to show that particular circumstances fall within an accepted exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's general rule that a warrant is required to enter a private dwelling. 
This view is completely in accord with United States Supreme Court cases and Utah 
cases concerning the Fourth Amendment. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App. 
1993); Welsh v. Wisconsin 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984); Mincey v. 
Arizona, All U.S. 385, 394-395, 98 S.Ct 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). 
The court then went on to define when exigent circumstances exist sufficient to 
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justify an exception to the general requirement of a warrant in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 
opinion. Again, this definition is absolutely in line with U.S. Supreme Court and Utah 
decisions. State v. Beavers, supra.; United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824,105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). Paragraph 9 of 
the opinion addresses the application of those principles to the review of the trial court's 
determination and then the court applies those principles to the specific findings of fact of 
the trial court in paragraphs 12 and 13. It is simply impossible to conclude that the court 
of appeals used an inappropriate standard of review or that the review of the decision was 
inaccurate. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DOES NOT SET AN UNREASONABLE 
STANDARD 
The opinion of the court of appeals in Stuart is very narrowly drawn. The bulk of 
the opinion concerned the point that the trial court's findings of fact were unchallenged 
and supported the trial court's conclusion of law. The Stuart opinion doesn't really set 
any standards for warrantless entries at all. It recognizes those standards previously set 
and well-recognized, then follows them. Paragraph 13 contains dicta misconstrued by 
Petitioner as necessary elements to find exigent circumstances. When the court made the 
statement that "the officers did not immediately physically intervene in the situation, 
draw weapons, or otherwise act in a manner suggesting an emergency," it was not 
declaring that such things must be done to enter a dwelling, only that the testimony 
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concerning the actions of the officers supported the trial court's conclusion that no 
emergency existed. Once they entered the home, the officers spent a great deal of time 
trying to draw attention to themselves , not intervening to protect anyone nor acting as 
though they needed to protect themselves nor giving any medical assistance to anyone. 
The court of appeals merely pointed out that the trial court's findings of fact did not 
include a finding that an emergency of any sort existed, and thus, a conclusion that there 
was no exigent circumstance was not in error. The standard for finding exigent 
circumstances, according to Stuart is that entry must be necessary to prevent physical 
harm to the officers or other persons, to prevent the destruction of relevant evidence or 
the escape of the suspect. The need for immediate entry must be apparent to police at the 
time of entry and it must be so strong as to outweigh the important protection of 
individual rights provided under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at P8. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO THE CONCLUSIION 
THAT PETITIONER DEMANDS 
Petitioner focuses upon paragraphs 4 & 5 of the Order on Motion to Suppress 
Evidence by the trial court (Addendum B). Specifically paragraph 4 states that there was 
"some kind of an altercation taking place, wherein it appeared that four adults were trying 
to control a juvenile. At one point, the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the 
occupants of the residence in the nose." Petitioner urges that upon reading the foregoing, 
no reasonable person could possibly conclude anything other than that the persons within 
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the house were facing an emergency of such proportions and gravity that the aid of 
immediate police intervention was absolutely necessary. This of course ignores the fact 
that the court was clearly taking the position that even if one views this situation in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, there was no emergency, at least nothing that 
required immediate intervention by the police, and certainly nothing outweighing the 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. The court made no findings indicating 
any emergency existed, nor that the police actually aided anyone. There was no finding 
that the police even separated the person struck from the person who struck him (which 
they did not). At no point did the court use the terms "fight," "combat," "combatants," 
"danger," "injury," "emergency," "threat,"' "risk," "serious," "harm," or anything similar 
to describe the situation. Without such a finding it would have been entirely 
inappropriate to conclude that an exigent circumstance requiring immediate, official 
action existed. 
A SIMPLIFIED VIEW OF THIS CASE 
The court of appeals ruled lhat the trial court's Findings of Fact were never 
challenged by Appellant and both Appellant and Appellees stipulated to those Findings 
of Fact. Petitioner did not object to this ruling in its petition nor address it in its brief. 
The court of appeals also ruled that the facts as found by the trial court supported the 
conclusion that no exigent circumstances existed. Petitioner objected to this ruling and 
has asked this court to rule that if police officers see an assault, that is an exigent 
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circumstance. The court of appeals also included certain dicta in its discussion of the 
case in paragraph 13. Petitioner strongly objected to that dicta citing it as the basis and 
reasoning for the court's decision. The dicta is merely explanatory. It was clearly not the 
basis for the decision and it is a non-issue. So is the matter of an assault. Regardless of 
how a police officer wants to label that which he sees, certain criteria must be met before 
a circumstance may be considered exigent with regard to an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth amendment. That which is legitimately before this Court on 
certiorari review is the issue of whether or not the Findings of Fact of the trial court 
preclude a reasonable person from coming to the conclusion to which the trial court 
arrived. If those two are indeed mutually exclusive, then the decision of the court of 
appeals is in error. If, however, given the facts specifically found by the trial court, a 
reasonable person could possibly conclude that the people within the house did not 
necessarily need immediate police intervention for their protection, then the court of 
appeals was not in error and the ruling must be affirmed. 
AN ADDITIONAL ISSUE-MINOR VIOLATIONS 
There is an additional issue that Petitioer has refused or neglected to discuss. That 
is that both Utah and U.S. cases point out that even if the prosecution can establish 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the exception to the warrant requirement is not 
applicable if there is only a minor violation involved. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 
14(footnote 6) (Utah App. 1993) quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753. Surely, 
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by anyone's standard, the violations with which these defendants were charged are minor 
violations and the result should be affirmed on this basis alone. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals accurately reviewed the decision of the trial court according 
to the proper standard of review. The Findings of Fact, to which both parties stipulated, 
not only support the conclusion of no exigent circumstance, without additional or even 
contrary findings, they preclude any other conclusion. Respondents respectfully urge the 
Court to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED OCTOBER 17, 2003. 
LOD GILMORE 
Attorney for Respondents 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAg: 
BRIGHAM CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHARLES W. STUART, SHAYNE R. 
TAYLOR, and SANDRA A. TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 001100454,001100456, and 
001100460 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
This matter came before the court for hearing the 23rd day of March, 2001 on defendants9 
motion to suppress. Brigham City was represented by James MerrelL Defendants were present 
and represented by Rod Gilmores After the presentation of evidence, including testimony and 
exhibits, the careful review of the parties' pleadings, and after having heard the parties9 
arguments, the Court hereby finds and orders as follows: 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
1. On July 23,2001, at approximately 3:00 a.m., four Brigham City Police officers were 
dispatched to 1074 Orchard St in Brigham City as a result of a call concerning a loud party. 
2. After arrival at the residence, the officers, from their observations from the front of the 
residence, determined that it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have done no 
good It was appropriate that they proceed down the driveway alongside the house to further 
investigate. 
3. After going down die driveway on the side of the house, the officers could see, through a 
slat fence, two juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages. At that point, because of the juveniles, 
there was probable cause for the officers to enter into the backyard. 
4. Upon entering the backyard, the officers observed, through windows and a screen door, 
CAQ-n LA 
an altercation taking place, wherein it appeared that four adults were trying to control a juvenile. 
At one point, the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in 
the nose. 
5. At that point in time, the court finds no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the 
officer's entry into the residence. What he should have done, as required under the 4th 
amendment, was knock on the door. The evidence is that there was a loud, tumultuous thing 
going on, and the evidence is that the occupants probably would not have heard him, but under 
the 4th amendment he has an obligation to at least attempt before entering. 
ORDER 
Based upon the above findings, and for good cause shown, the Court HEREBY 
ORDERS: 
The Motion to Suppress filed by defendants is GRANTED. All evidence gathered or 
seized subsequent to the officers9 entry into the house, including but not limited to physical 
evidence, photographs taken, observations made by the officers, and statements and actions 
made by the suspects, are HEREBY SUPPRESSED, and not admissible in any further 
proceeding against the defendants. 
DATED, this the 1*6 day of May, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
f. * 
\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UPON OPPOSINC COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, counsel for Plaintiff 
hereby certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing Order upon RooVCnifcqre^attojTievibr 
defendants, at 154 Blue Sage LaneyfcaytoiHsJJT 84041, by moling a ^opy th^fofthej£_^ day 
of May, 2001. 
5rfcaytoM  
ATTORNEY 
Notice of objection to the proposed documents must be submitted to the Court and 
counsel within five (5) days after service. 
ADDENDUM B 
BRIGHAM LIT 
Cite as 57 P.3d III! 
2002 UrApp317 
BRIGHAM CITY, a municipal 
corporation, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Charles W. STUART, Shayne R. Taylor, 
and Sandra A. Taylor, Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 20010479-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 3, 2002 
Defendants were charged in the First 
District Court, Brigham City Department, 
Clint S. Judkins, J., with contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, 
intoxication, and filed a motion to suppress 
which was granted. City appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Thome, J., held that exigent 
circumstances did not exist to justify officers' 
warrantless entry into private residence. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, J., dissented and filed a separate 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <S=»1134<3), 1158(4) 
An appellate court reviews the factual 
findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence 
for clear error, and the legal conclusions for 
correctness, with a measure of discretion giv-
en to the trial judge's application of the legal 
standard to the facts. 
2. Searches and Seizures <*»40.1,42.J 
A warrantless search of a residence is 
constitutionally permissible where probable 
cause and exigent circumstances are proven 
U.S.CA ConstAmend. 4. 
3. Searches and Seizures $»192.1 
When a private residence is involved, the 
State's burden in proving the existence of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless search is particularly 
heavy; such elevated burden is a result of the 
heightened expectation of privacy that citi-
zens enjoy in their homes. U.S.CLA. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures e»42.1 
"Exigent circumstances" needed to justi-
fy a warrantless search exist where a reason-
Y v. STUAEII 
(UtahApp. 2002) 
able person m the officers* position would 
believe that entry was necessary to prevent 
physical harm to the officers or other per-
sons, to prevent the destruction of relevant 
evidence, to prevent the escape of the sus-
pect, or to prevent the improper frustration 
of legitimate law enforcement efforts. 
H.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
5. Searches and Seizures e=»42.1 
in order for exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless search, the need for 
immediate entry must be apparent to police 
at the time of entry, and so strong as to 
outweigh the important protection of individ-
ual rights provided under the Fourth 
Amendment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures <s=s»42.1 
The determination by an appellate court 
of exigent circumstances needed to justify a 
warrantless search is based upon an exami-
nation of the totality of the circumstances. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4 
7. Searches and Seizures <s=»201 
An appellate court grants the trial court 
a degree of discretion in determining the 
ultimate disposition concerning whether exi-
gent circumstances justify a warrantless 
search because the facts to which the legal 
rule is to be applied are so complex and 
varying that no rule adequately addressing 
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled 
jut. 
8. Criminal Law <35»1158(1) 
An appellate court is entrusted with en-
suring legal accuracy and uniformity and 
should defer to the trial court on factual 
matters. 
9. Searches and Seizures @=»42.1 
Exigent circumstances did not exist to 
justify officers' warrantless entry into private 
residence; while evidence existed that some 
sort of altercation had occurred in the resi-
dence, nothing indicated that the altercation 
posed an immediate serious threat or created 
a threat of escalating violence, officers did 
not immediately physically intervene in the 
situation, draw weapons, or otherwise act in 
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a manner suggesting an emergency, and 
findings did not support a conclusion that the 
destruction of evidence would have occurred, 
that the escape of any suspect was imminent, 
or that any legitimate law enforcement effort 
would have been frustrated had the officers 
not been granted immediate entry into the 
residence. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
10. Criminal Law e»1028 
Generally, absent exceptional circum-
stances or plain error, a party who fails to 
bring an issue to the trial court's attention is 
barred from asserting it on appeal 
11. Criminal Law e»1031(l) 
City failed to preserve for appellate re-
view its claim that officers were justified in 
entering private residence because officers 
observed first-hand the commission of a 
crime, where city failed to raise such argu-
ment at trial level and failed to argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
Leonard J. Carson, Mann, Hadfield & 
Thome, Brigham City, for Appellant 
Rod Gilmore, Layton, for Appellees. 
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, 
andTHORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge. 
11 Brigham City appeals from an interloc-
utory order granting Defendants* joint Mo-
tion to Suppress Evidence collected after 
Brigham City police officers entered a pri-
vate residence without first obtaining a war-
rant We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On July 23,2000, at approximately 3:00 
a.m., four Brigham City police officers re-
sponded to a loud party complaint After 
arriving at the house, the officers proceeded 
to the back of the house to investigate the 
noise. From the driveway, through a slat 
fence, the officers saw two young men, who 
appeared to be under age, consuming alcohol. 
The officers entered the backyard through a 
gate, thereby obtaining a clear view into the 
back of the house. 
13 Looking into the house through a 
screen door and two windows, the officers 
observed four adults restraining one juvenile. 
The juvenile, who was struggling to break 
free, managed to swing his fist and strike one 
of the adults in the face. Two of the officers 
then opened the screen door and stepped 
into the house. Only after entering the 
house did one of the officers shout to identify 
and call attention to himself. One by one, 
each person in the kitchen became aware of 
and acknowledged the officers* presence, 
then become angry that the officers had en-
tered the house without permission. 
14 The officers subsequently arrested 
each of the adults and charged them with: 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
disorderly conduct, and intoxication. Defen-
dants filed a joint Motion to Suppress Evi-
dence. After an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court granted Defendants' motion. 
Brigham City submitted a proposed order to 
the trial court that contained the trial court's 
findings of fact That order was signed as 
proposed and it is from this order that Brig-
ham City now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 15 We review the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress evidence for clear 
error, and the legal conclusions for correct-
ness, ''with a measure of discretion given to 
the trial judge's application of the legal stan-
dard to the facts.** State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 
1245,1247 (Utah CtApp.1996). 
16 In the present case, neither party dis-
putes the written factual findings that sup-
port the trial court's legal conclusion that no 
exigent circumstances justified the officers* 
warrantless entry into the private residence. 
We accordingly review the trial court's appli-
cation of Fourth Amendment principles to 
the undisputed facts of this case. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
[2,3] 17 Brigham City argues the trial 
court erred in determining that there were 
no exigent circumstances to justify the war-
rantless entry into a private residence. MA 
warrantless search of a residence is constitu-
tionally permissible where probable cause 
and exigent circumstances are proven." 
BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART 
Cite as 57 P 3d 1111 (I'tahApp. 2002) 
TTtah H 1 3 
State v. Yoden 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. 
App.1997). When a private residence is in-
volved, the State's burden in proving the 
existence of probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances is "particularly heavy." Id. (cita-
tions and quotations omitted). This elevated 
burden is a result of the "heightened expec-
tation of privacy" that citizens enjoy in their 
homes. State v. Beaver^ &59 P2d 9f 13 
CUtah Ct.App.1993) 
[4,5] US Exigent circumstances exist 
where a reasonable person in the officers' 
position would " 'believe that entry was nec-
essary to prevent physical harm to the offi-
cers or other persons, [to prevent] the de-
struction of relevant evidence, [to prevent] 
the escape of the suspect,' " or to prevent the 
improper frustration of legitimate law en-
forcement efforts. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 
(citation and ellipsis omitted). In addition, 
the need for immediate entry must be appar-
ent to police at the time of entry, and so 
strong as to outweigh the important protec-
tion of individual rights provided under the 
Fourth Amendment See id. 
[6,7] 19 Our determination of exigency 
is based upon an examination of the totality 
of the circumstances. See State v. Wells, 928 
P.2d 386, 389 (Utah CtApp.1996), affd, 939 
P.2d 1204. We grant the trial court a degree 
of discretion in determining the ultimate dis-
position because " 'the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and 
varying that no rule adequately addressing 
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled 
out. . . . ' " State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 
929 (Utah CtApp.1994) (ellipsis in original) 
(quoting State u Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 
(Utah 1994)). 
[8] f 10 We first address Brigham City's 
request, made during oral argument, that 
this court make any additional findings of 
fact that might be necessary to find exigent 
circumstances in this case. However, an 
" 'appellate court is entrusted with ensuring 
legal accuracy and uniformity and should de-
fer to the trial court on factual matters.' " 
Bailey v. BayUs, 2002 UT 58,119, 52 P.3d 
1. The trial court first directed Defendants t 
draft and submit an appropriate order. Brigham 
City, however, objected to the findings as drafted 
and proffered a substitution. Over Defendant's 
objections, the trial court adopted Brigham City s 
1158 (quoting Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 
230-31 (Utah 1997)). The supreme court has 
further determined: 
It is inappropriate for an appellate court to 
disregard the trial court's findings of fact 
and to assume the role of weighing evi-
dence and making its own findings of fact 
The court of appeals is limited to the find-
ings of fact made by the trial court and 
may not find mm facts or reweigh the 
evidence. . . 
Id. at 1 f 19-20. 
f 11 In addition, Brigham City has previ-
ously forsaken an opportunity to shape the 
trial court's findings of fact1 Brigham City 
has not, however, challenged the trial court's 
factual findings. We therefore accept the 
findings as adopted and are in no position to 
supplement these findings. Thus, based 
upon the factual findings set forth in the trial 
court's order, we review the trial court's legal 
conclusion that no exigent circumstances ex-
isted in this case 
t12 Brigham City next argues that the 
circumstances, as found by the court, clearly 
establish exigent circumstances supporting 
the officers' warrantless entry into the pri-
vate residence. The trial court made the 
following findings of fact: 
1. On July 23,2001, at approximately 3:00 
a.m., four Brigham. City Policy officers 
were dispatched . . . as a result of a call 
concerning a loud party. 
2. After arrival at the residence, the offi-
cers, from their observations from the 
front of the residence, determined that it 
was obvious that knocking on the front 
door would have done no good. It was 
appropriate that they proceed down the 
driveway alongside the house to further 
investigate. 
3. After going down the driveway on the 
side of the house, the officers could see, 
through a slat fence, two juveniles consum-
ing alcoholic beverages. At that point, 
because of the juveniles, there was proba-
tision ot the ordei and findings Therefore, 
any findings Brigham City considered necessary 
to support a conclusion of exigent circumstances 
should have been included in this order 
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ble cause for the officers to enter into the 
backyard. 
4. Upon entering the backyard, the offi-
cers observed, through windows and a 
screen door an altercation taking place, 
wherein it appeared that four adults were 
trying to control a juvenile. At one point, 
the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked 
one of the occupants of the residence in 
the nose. 
5. At that point in time, the court finds 
no exigent circumstances to justify the offi-
cer's entry into the residence. What he 
should have done, as required under the 
4th amendment, was knock on the door. 
The evidence is that there was a loud, 
tumultuous thing going on, and the evi-
dence is that the occupants probably would 
not have heard, but under the 4th amend-
ment he has an obligation to at least at-
tempt before entering. 
[9] 113 After reviewing the trial court's 
ruling, we conclude that the trial court prop-
erly determined that the officers' warrantless 
entry into the private residence was not jus-
tified by the circumstances. The trial court 
found that some sort of altercation had oc-
curred in the house, but made no findings; 
from which we could reasonably conclude 
that the altercation posed an immediate seri-
ous threat or created a threat of escalating 
violence. Furthermore, the officers did not, 
immediately physically intervene in the situa-
tion, draw weapons, or otherwise act in a 
manner suggesting an emergency. Neither 
do the trial court's findings support a conclu-
sion that the destruction of evidence would 
2. In reaching its conclusion, the dissent relics 
upon State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 
55, where police entered a home without a war* 
rant in response to a domestic violence com-
plaint Id at 123. In Comer, "admittedly a 
close case," we stated that "the officers had 
probable cause to believe a domestic violence 
offense had been, or was being, committed." Id 
at 12S. We noted that a " 'domestic violence 
complaint" is 'one of the most potentially danger-
ous, volatile arrest situations confronting po-
lice.' " Id (citations omitted). We identified the 
specific facts that would prompt the police to 
believe "there was no time to get a warrant 
and/or that [their] presence was necessary to 
prevent physical harm to persons or the destruc-
tion of evidence." Id at 126. The combination 
of these factors warranted a finding of exigent 
circumstances. See id The holding in Comer, 
have occurred, that the escape of any suspect 
was imminent, or that any legitimate law 
enforcement effort would have been frustrat-
ed had the officers not been granted immedi-
ate entry into the home. On these limited 
facts, we affirm the trial court's conclusion 
that exigent circumstances did not exist2 
[10,11] f 14 Brigham City next argues 
that the officers were justified in entering 
this private residence because the officers 
observed, first-hand, the commission of a 
crime. Generally, absent exceptional circum-
stances or plain error, a party who fails to 
bring an issue to the trial court's attention is 
barred from asserting it on appeal. See 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 
(Utah CtApp.1991). Brigham City neither 
raised this argument to the trial court, nor 
argued plain error or exceptional circum-
stances on appeal We therefore decline to 
address this argument 
CONCLUSION 
f 15 Because we defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact and, to a limited extent, to 
the trial court's application of those facts to 
the law, we conclude that the trial court did 
not err in concluding that no exigent circum-
stances existed under these facts. There-
fore, we affirm the trial court's grant of 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress all evidence 
resulting from the officer's entry into the 
private residence. 
f 16 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Judge. 
however, should be narrowly construed, see id. at 
n. 11 (characterizing the Comer opinion as adopt-
ing approach "for analyzing warrantless police 
entry into a private residence after receipt of a 
report of domestic violence at that residence") 
and only applies when the threat of continued 
domestic violence is present 
The case at bar is distinguishable from Comer, 
for this is not a "domestic violence" situation. 
Additionally, the trial court found that the juve-
nile who seemed to be causing the commotion 
was restrained when the police arrived. Thus, 
except for the fact that the juvenile's hand broke 
loose and "smacked one of the occupants of the 
residence in the nose," all violence had ceased by 
the time the officers arrived. Also, unlike Comer, 
the police in the case at bar had a clear view of 
the interior of the home and could have inter-
vened had further violence ensued. 
BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART 
die M 17 FM 1111 (Utah App"2002) 
Utah 111 I 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting). 
117 The outcome of this case is controlled 
by our recent decision in State v. Comer, 
2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55. In Comer, 
officers arrived at a home after receiving a 
call from a citizen that a family fight was in 
progress. See id at K2. The defendant 
opened the door and stepped out onto the 
porch. See id The officers explained to her 
why they were there and asked if anyone 
else was home. See id. The defendant did 
not respond, but " 'immediately turned and 
walked back inside the residence.' " Id The 
officers followed and discovered defendant's 
husband who had marks on his body indicat-
ing he had been assaulted. See id at K 3. 
While arresting the defendant for assault, 
the officers also discovered drugs and drug 
paraphernalia* See id at 14. 
K18 We concluded that both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances existed to 
justify the officers' warrantless entry into the 
defendant's home. See id at f 27. We cited 
several reasons why the defendant's unex-
plained behavior "would cause an officer to 
reasonably believe there was no time to get a 
warrant and/or that his presence was neces-
sary to prevent physical harm to persons or 
the destruction of evidence/* including the 
officers' reasonable fear that defendant re-
treated to "immediately resume the alterca-
tion reported." Id at 126. 
119 If, as we concluded in Comer, an 
individual's unexplained behavior and retreat 
posed an exigent circumstance, then certainly 
a fight in progress qualifies as an exigent 
circumstance. In this case, the officers re-
sponded to a citizen's call in the middle of the 
night about a "loud party or altercation." 
The trial court found that the fight they 
witnessed was so "loud" and ''tumultuous" 
that the occupants of the residence could not 
have heard a knock at the door. The officers 
personally observed a group of adults re-
strain a juvenile, who broke loose one arm 
and "smacked one of the [adults] in the 
nose." These findings do not support the 
trial court's conclusion that the officers' war-
rantless entry into the home was not justified 
by exigent circumstances.1 
1. The officers might also have been justified in 
entering the residence pursuant to the emergen-
cy aid doctrine a lanaof to the exigent circum 
1120 The majority argues thai Comer is 
distinguishable and should be narrowly con-
strued to apply only to known incidences of 
domestic violence. I disagree that the exi-
gent circumstances doctrine applies only to 
domestic violence situations. However, even 
assuming, as the majority does, that Comer 
only applies to domestic violence, this case is 
not distinguishable. The difference between 
a simple assault and a domestic violence as-
sault is the relationship between the parties 
involved. From their vantage point outside 
the house, the officers in this case could not 
know whether any of the combatants in the 
house were "cohabitants" as defined by Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (Supp.2002). Based on 
the fact that a juvenile and several adults 
were involved and that the altercation was 
occurring at a residence, it would be reason-
able for the officers to assume that the alter-
cation may have been domestic violence. 
Further, I cannot agree with the majority 
that the violence had ceased by the time the 
officers arrived. The officers testified to wit-
nessing a loud, tumultuous altercation where 
one individual was being physically re-
strained and another had been struck. Even 
after entering the house, the officers had a 
difficult time getting the attention of the 
combatants. It is nonsensical to require offi-
cers, charged with keeping the peace, to 
witness this degree of violence and take no 
action until they see it escalate further. 
121 Alternatively, we could remand to the 
trial court for a finding on the city's assertion 
that the officers were justified in entering 
the house because a crime was being commit-
ted in their presence. The majority opinion 
does not address this argument, claiming 
that it was not raised before the trial court. 
However, the record reflects that the city did 
raise the issue to the trial court in the "Plain-
tiffs Response to Motion to Suppress." The 
city alleged that "the exigent circumstances 
which existed included obvious violations of 
the law in the plain view and presence of the 
officers." Because the trial court made no 
specific findings regarding violations of law, 
the case could be remanded with instructions 
ID the trial court to address whether the 
stances exception See Salt Lake City v Daud 
son 2000 UT App 12 1 10 994 P 2d 1283. 
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officers were justified in entering the home 
because a crime was being committed in 
their presence. 
U22 Accordingly, under Comer, I would 
reverse the trial court's grant of Defendants' 
motion to suppress. Alternatively, my col-
leagues should remand for findings on the 
cit/s argument that a crime was being com-
mitted in the presence of the officers. 
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Andrew D. MOENCH, Petitioner 
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v, 
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Defendant brought petition for postcon-
viction relief alleging that counsel was inef-
fective, his plea was involuntary, he was sen-
tenced under an unconstitutional statute, and 
the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to 
impose sentence. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Department, William W. Barrett, 
J., dismissed petition as frivolous, and defen-
dant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Thorne, J., held that: (1) defendant's petition 
for postconviction relief was not frivolous on 
its face, and (2) trial court exceeded the 
bounds of its review. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law «=> 1134(3) 
An appeal from a judgment on a petition 
for post conviction relief raises questions of 
law reviewed for correctness, giving no def-
erence to the trial court's conclusion. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>1580(10) 
Defendant's petition for postconviction 
relief was not frivolous on its face, and thus 
remand was required for the trial court to 
order the attorney general to file a response 
and to hold, if necessary, an evidentiary 
hearing; defendant's allegations that he en-
tered a guilty plea based on false promise of 
counsel, and that counsel failed to object 
when defendant was sentenced under gang 
enhancement statute that had been declared 
unconstitutional, stated a prima facie claim 
that his counsel was ineffective. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
65C(g). 
3. Criminal Law <S=>1134(3) 
Construction of a rule presents a ques-
tion of law, which is reviewed for correctness 
and without deference to the lower court's 
conclusion. 
4. Criminal Law <£=>1575 
When a court receives a petition for post 
conviction relief it must first evaluate the 
petition to determine whether any claim has 
been previously adjudicated or whether the 
petition appears frivolous on its face. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g). 
5. Criminal Law <s»1592 
If the facts alleged in the petition for 
postconviction relief do not support a claim 
for relief as a matter of law, or if the claims 
have no arguable basis in fact, then the court 
shall dismiss the petition as frivolous on its 
face. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g). 
6. Criminal Law <3=>1575 
To determine whether a post conviction 
petition is frivolous, a trial court need only 
determine whether the petition contains suf-
ficient facts to state a cause of action. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g). 
7. Criminal Law <S=»1575 
A trial court must review a post convic-
tion petition on its face to ensure that the 
petitioner pleaded each element of the relief 
sought Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g). 
8. Criminal Law <&=»1575 
Trial court exceeded the bounds of its 
review of a petition for post conviction relief 
when it addressed the underlying merits of 
the defendant's petition, rather than deter-
mining whether petition was frivolous. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65C(g). 
Bruce A. Jacques, South Jordan, for Ap-
pellant. 
